Social representations can be conveyed through language, which expresses a construction of the reality. Assuming the complex task of analyzing the results of a qualitative study, this article exposes from a structuralist approach, a proposal to analyze and construct social representations from the central core theory. Thus validate in methodological terms, a way to graphically express results for a holistic analysis and interpretation of these central and peripheral notions. The proposal is elaborated for application in studies with primary sources such (...) as interviews and their treatment through a content analysis. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo determine the factors associated with quality of life and depressive symptoms in Peruvian university students during the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsMulticentre study in 1,634 students recruited by convenience sampling. The quality of life was assessed with the European Quality of Life-5 Dimensions at three levels and depressive symptoms with the Patient Health Questionnaire-9. To assess factors associated with QoL and depressive symptoms, linear regressions and fitted regressions were used, with robust coefficients of variance information.ResultsA 345 reported problems in performing daily activities, (...) 544 reported pain and discomfort, 772 were moderately/very anxious or depressed. Furthermore, 207 had moderate-severe and severe depressive symptoms. Men reported better QoL than women and fewer depressive symptoms. Ayacucho’s residents had more depressive symptoms than Ancash’s residents and Piura’s residents had fewer depressive symptoms than Ancash’s residents. Students who left home during quarantine reported more depressive symptoms.ConclusionProblems performing daily activities, pain and discomfort, as well as mild to severe depressive symptoms were found in more than three-quarters of the sample. Authorities could consider depression care to improve quality of life in regions where high rates of infection occurred during the pandemic. (shrink)

Une théorie qui veut établir les principes d'une science du droit, mais dont les fondements épistémologiques remontent aux premières années du XXe siècle, peut-elle garder sa validité de nos jours ?

Desde el análisis y revisión documental, se genera un estudio descriptivo causa – efecto de migración campesina a las grandes ciudades, a fin de identificar génesis de la problemática y proponer estrategias que permitan el fortalecimiento de la actividad agrícola a partir de políticas que garanticen uso, propiedad y legalidad de territorios rurales en Colombia, buscando profesionalizar el campo como escenario de múltiples oportunidades de actuales y venideras generaciones, un campo capaz de generar riqueza, preservar, prolongar y renovar una cultura (...) agrícola hacedora de recursos suficientes para la satisfacción de necesidades y realización personal, profesional y económica de las comunidades campesinas. (shrink)

Uno puede pagar individualmente, pero uno siempre consume en una red de influencias, de partencias, a la que llamamos, por sintetizar, un "grupo de referencia". Esta red en la que estamos es el campo en el que se elaboran nuestras afinidades, gustos, criterios estéticos y aun éticos o políticos.

La 4e de couverture indique : "Dès la fin du XVIIIe siècle, la référence à Rousseau devient incontournable pour la pensée juridique, comme si toute réflexion sur le droit, et pas uniquement dans le domaine du droit public, devrait régler ses comptes avec le Genevois. Bien entendu, cette référence changera de signification politique avec le temps et l’évolution des institutions étatiques européennes. Mais l’extension du suffrage universel et la consolidation de la démocratie au XXe siècle sont loin de signer la (...) fin des querelles autour de l’œuvre. Au contraire, la question Rousseau revient dans toute grande théorie du droit public. Et l’histoire de ce cheminement nous livre un ensemble d’indices dont l’intérêt va au-delà du droit. Les différents chapitres de l’ouvrage se proposent d’explorer, à partir de l’étude de quelques grands juristes français et allemands, la portée que la philosophie de Rousseau a pu avoir pour la pensée juridique.". (shrink)

Au fil du temps, l'Europe est devenue un objet central de la philosophie politique d'Étienne Balibar. Née sur le terreau de sa réflexion sur le racisme, cette pensée s'est concentrée toujours davantage sur la construction européenne et ses impasses. En ce sens, il s'agit d'une vision marquée par la crise et, de ce fait même, guidée par le souci et l'urgence de la démocratisation de l'Union européenne ou, ce qui revient au même, de sa transformation. Les problèmes de la citoyenneté, (...) des frontières, du positionnement géopolitique, de la constitution, des choix économiques, des migrants ont ainsi aimanté l'élaboration d'un ensemble de concepts originaux pour penser ces enjeux, formant une œuvre dont l'ampleur et l'extension n'ont probablement d'autre équivalent, dans la scène philosophique contemporaine, que l'entreprise de Jürgen Habermas. Les auteures et les auteurs de cet ouvrage - juristes, philosophes, politistes, venus de France et d'ailleurs - engagent à leur tour un échange productif avec les principaux concepts et propositions d'Étienne Balibar sur l'Europe, convaincus de leur intérêt théorique intrinsèque mais également de l'horizon post-national dans lequel le politique se déploie désormais. Ce qui donne l'occasion à Étienne Balibar de relancer, encore une fois, la discussion. (shrink)

The Purpose in Life Test is a measure of purpose in life widely used in many cultures and countries; however, cross-cultural assessments are scarce. The present study aimed to evaluate the cross-cultural measurement invariance of the PIL in the general population of seven Latin American countries. A total of 4306 people participated, selected by non-probabilistic convenience sampling, where Uruguay has the highest mean age ; while Ecuador has the lowest mean age. Furthermore, in each country, there is a higher proportion (...) of women than men. Using Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis, the factorial structure does not show evidence of invariance among the included countries. However, based on the Multi-Group Factor Analysis Alignment, there is evidence that a three-dimensional structure of the PIL is the same in the participating countries. Results based on item response theory indicate that most PIL items can significantly differentiate responses according to the level of life purpose. In addition, people with low life purpose will tend to choose the lower response alternatives on the PIL; while people with higher life purpose will choose higher response alternatives. The findings indicate that the PIL has the potential to increase knowledge about how people conceive and experience their purpose in life in different countries. (shrink)

L’ouvrage intitulé Comment écrit-on l’histoire constitutionnelle ?, réunit les communications d’un colloque qui s’est tenu à Cergy-Pontoise le 17 octobre 2008. Le titre est évidemment emprunté au célèbre ouvrage de Paul Veyne, mais le choix de la forme interrogative signale d’entrée le caractère exploratoire de l’entreprise. Dans leur efficace synthèse introductive, les organisateurs du colloque mettent en valeur un paradoxe : alors que l’histoire constitutionnelle fait l’objet, dans de nombreux pays, d’un engouement remarquable, la question de son domaine, de sa (...) méthode et de ses enjeux n’a suscité en France que peu de réflexions approfondies. L’entreprise a donc pour objet d’ouvrir le débat, mais non bien sûr de le clore. Comme c’est souvent le cas des actes de colloque, le livre trouve une limite dans l’hétérogénéité et la brièveté des interventions. Sur de telles questions, les généralités sont peu éclairantes, car trop évidentes pour ne pas être consensuelles (nécessité de lire et .. (shrink)

La creación burlada trata de la más terrible de las sospechas: que toda nuestra vida se halle edificada sobre un inmenso fraude. Esta cuarta parte de la importante Seudología general que Miguel Catalán viene preparando durante los últimos años estudia la ilusión del cosmos y el fraude de la vida, dos nociones que han expresado desde antiguo el miedo de los hombres a verse engañados por fuerzas sobrenaturales. La experiencia, tan penosa como universal, del niño que descubre por vez (...) primera la mentira de los adultos, así como el temor a la falsedad del mundo y el fraude de la vida aparecen en los grandes textos originarios, desde los Vedas y Homero hasta el Barroco y los relatos actuales, Matrix o El show de Truman. El libro recoge, pues, las distintas formas culturales en que se ha manifestado la conciencia de que los dioses y otros poderes numinosos, incluyendo la naturaleza deificada, han engañado a los hombres en virtud del inmenso poder y conocimiento de que disponen en comparación con la debilidad y la ignorancia propiamente humanas. A partir de esa conciencia de inferioridad de los hombres se despliegan los tópicos de la vida como engaño de la naturaleza, como juego de los dioses ociosos, como teatro del mundo, como sueño en la mente de Dios, o carrera en el laberinto o ejercicio de poder demiúrgico. Miguel Catalán González (Valencia, 1958), Doctor en Filosofía con una tesis sobre el pragmatismo clásico y profesor de Ética y Deontología en la Universidad UCH-CEU de Valencia, es autor de una veintena de libros, entre los que destacan sus obras filosóficas Pensamiento y acción o Proceso a la guerra, la colección de aforismos El sol de medianoche (Edicions de Ponent, 2001) y el prólogo a su propio Diccionario de falsas creencias (Ronsel, 2002), que manifiesta por vez primera el interés del autor por las relaciones entre error y falsedad. Con El prestigio de la lejanía. Ilusión, autoengaño y utopía (Ronsel, 2004), Premio de Ensayo Juan Gil-Albert en 1998 y a su vez de la Crítica Valenciana en 2005, Catalán dio inicio a su investigación sobre el engaño. A este siguió Antropología de la mentira (Muchnik, 2005), que fue premio de ensayo Alfons el Magnànim, y en tercer lugar, Anatomía del secreto (Muchnik, 2008). Ha sido editor y traductor, entre otros, de Karl Krause, Marcel Proust y Ambrose Bierce. En 2005 obtuvo el Premio Nacional de Investigación “Ángel Herrera” por su labor en el ámbito de las ciencias sociales. (shrink)

Reseñado por JUAN JOSÉ HERRERA Universidad del Norte Santo Tomás de Aquino San Miguel de Tucumán, AR [email protected].

Les juges créent-ils du droit ? Eros Roberto Grau, avocat, ancien professeur à la prestigieuse Faculté de droit de l’Université de São Paulo et ancien membre de la Cour suprême brésilienne de 2004 à 2010, aurait sans aucun doute pu faire un livre inaccessible sur cette question, tant son parcours, ses forts engagements et ses réflexions prolifiques l’y autorisent.Sa biographie est en particulier disponible en brésilien sur le site de la Cour suprême brésilienne et sur son site personnel . Mais (...) le présent ouvrage édité par Carlos Miguel Herrera, « texte de combat » selon son préfacier Antoine Jeammaud, est une invitation à mieux découvrir l’approche critique du droit défendue par l’auteur sous l’angle d’une théorie réaliste de l’interprétation aussi habile qu’originale. Classiquement, selon cette dernière, on ne le sait que trop bien, le droit n’est pas à considérer c .. (shrink)

Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be partially vindicated. Arguing that extant discussion is problematically imprecise, we will finesse the (...) notion of ‘philosophical expertise’ in order to better reflect the complex reality of the different practices involved in philosophical inquiry. On this basis, we offer a new version of the expertise defence that allows for distinct types of philosophical expertise. The upshot of our approach is that wholesale vindications or rejections of the expertise defence are shown to be unwarranted; we must instead turn to local, piecemeal investigations of philosophical expertise. Lastly, in the spirit of taking our own advice, we exemplify how recent developments from experimental philosophy lend themselves to this approach, and can empirically support one instance of a successful expertise defence. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

The acknowledged masterpiece of Unamuno expresses the anguish of modern man as he is caught up in the struggle between the dictates of reason and the demands of his own heart.

Empirical findings about intuitions putatively cast doubt on the traditional methodology of philosophy. Herman Cappelen and Max Deutsch have argued that these methodological concerns are unmotivated as experimental findings about intuitions are irrelevant for assessments of the methodology of philosophy—I dub this the ‘Irrelevance Claim’. In this paper, I first explain that for Cappelen and Deutsch to vindicate the Irrelevance Claim from a forceful objection, their arguments have to establish that intuitions play no epistemically significant role whatsoever in philosophy—call this (...) the ‘Orthogonality Claim’. I then argue that even under a charitable reading of their views Cappelen and Deutsch fail to establish the Orthogonality Claim. Lastly, I discuss empirical evidence that the Orthogonality Claim is false. The arguments in this paper will demonstrate that Cappelen and Deutsch cannot motivate the Irrelevance Claim and that their replies to recent experimental attacks on traditional methodology of philosophy do not succeed. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...) the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness. (shrink)

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...) Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

Research on the normative ideal of democracy has taken a sharp deliberative and epistemic turn. It is now increasingly common for claims about the putative cognitive benefits of political deliberation to play central roles in normative arguments for democracy. In this paper, I argue that the most prominent epistemic defences of deliberative democracy fail. Relying on empirical findings on the workings of implicit bias, I show that they overstate the epistemic virtues of political deliberation. I also argue that findings in (...) cognitive and social psychology can aid in the development of a new and improved generation of epistemic arguments for deliberative democracy. (shrink)